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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ARNOLD MACHINERY COMPANY,
a Utah corporation,
CASE NO.

Plaintiff,

14337

vs.
CLIFFORD A. PRINCE, dba
PRINCE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY
and WESTERN SURETY COMPANY,
INC., a corporation,
Defendants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
ARNOLD MACHINERY COMPANY ,

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE

-^

"

This is an action to recover from a subcontractor
and his surety for rental of equipment.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The matter was entirely disposed of by summary judg-

CD
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ments.

The court granted plaintiff Arnold's motion

for summary judgment awarding Arnold judgment in the
amount of $11,415.74 against the subcontractor, Prince.
The court denied Arnold!s motion for summary judgment
against Prince's surety, Western Surety Company.

The

court granted the surety company's motion to dismiss
the action against it on the grounds that the action
was barred by the .one year statute of limitations in
14-2-2 UCA, 1953.

' '

~

m,
^•m*:
;fei.,

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Arnold seeks judgment against Prince's surety
company in the amount of $11,415.74, the amount awarded it against Prince, together with interest thereafter,
by reversal of the summary judgment dismissing the surety
company and reversal of the denial of Arnold's motion
for summary judgment against the surety company.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

' -

R. C. Tolman Construction Company was the prime
contractor for construction of a roadway and lagoons
for a sanitation system at Fish Lake, Utah for the
United States Forest Service.

Prince entered into a

(2)
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subcontract with Tolman to do excavation work.

Prince

rented a "Payscraper" from Arnold for that excavation
work.

Tolman, as prime contractor for a public work of

the United States, was required by the Miller Act, 40
USCA 2 70(a) to furnish a performance and payment bond
to the United States, which Tolman furnished.

However,

that is not the bond involved in this action.
•— Tolman, in turn, although not required to do so
by any statute, required Prince to furnish a bond guaranteeing that Prince, as subcontractor, would "promptly
pay all persons supplying labor or materials."

Prince

obtained the bond required by Tolman from defendant

^

Western Surety Company, Inc., and furnished it to Tolman.

Arnold asserts rights under that bond as a third

party beneficiary.

, ,,

Prince failed to pay the agreed rental to Arnold^
Arnold brought this action against Prince and his surety, Western.

The bond contained no provision limiting

the time for commencing action thereunder.

The action

was commenced slightly more than one year after the
termination of the rental agreement.

' ;•

Western's answer contained a general denial, an
affirmative defense of the one year statute of limitations contained in the Miller Act, 40 USCA, Section

(3)
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2 70(b), and a further affirmative defense that inasmuch as the contract involved a federal construction
project, jurisdiction was vested by the Miller Act
solely in the federal district court.
Arnold moved for partial summary judgment on the
grounds that, except for the amount of the obligation
(which has since been adjudicated) there was no genuine issue of fact and that the sole issues between
Arnold and Western were issues of law, all of which
should be resolved in Arnold's favor.

Arnold con-

tended that (1) the state court had jurisdiction;
(2) the Miller Act one year statute of limitations
was inapplicable, and (3) Arnold was a third party
beneficiary of the bond and was, therefore, a real
party in interest;
Western also moved for summary judgment seeking
dismissal from the action, asserting that (1) the
state court had no jurisdiction and (2) the Miller
Act one year statute of limitation barred the action.
In its memorandum in support of its motion, Western
asserted not only the one year federal Miller Act
limitation, but also one year limitations provided
in two state statutes.

^

One state limitation asserted is that set forth

(4)
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in 14-1-6 UCA, which is a limitation relating to bonding requirements for state, as distinguished from federal, construction projects (14-1-1.1 UCA).

The act

is sometimes referred to as the "Little-Miller Act."
It requires a bond to be furnished to the State of
Utah or to its political subdivisions for state or
county construction projects.
."

The other state limitation asserted by Western

is 14-2-2 UCA which is a limitation relating to private contracts, whereby an owner of land who enters
into a contract involving $500 or more for construction of improvements thereon is required to furnish
a bond. (14-2-1 UCA)

J

Although not raised by Western, the court also
considered the one year limitation period in 38-1-11
UCA relating to mechanic's liens.

(38-1-1 UCA)

The court in its memorandum decision denying
Arnold^
as

follOWSf

granting Western's motion, reasone
: :

:.'/...'"•'.'" ^'••••''

- '•••r •••.-'.-

"•:••

"Under Section 270(b) of Title 40, USCA,
it is apparent that parties furnishing materials on a job covered by the Miller Act,
whether they be subcontractors or suppliers
. ...
to subcontractors, have a right of action on
the bond required by that Act. If their
rights under the act are asserted pursuant
to that statute, then the action must be
- < filed in the federal court within the time w

(5)
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required by that statute. However, the
Miller Act does not make action under that
statute the exclusive remedy to a material
or labor claim for materials or services
furnished on a federal project and if an
unpaid materialman or laborer chooses not
to sue under the act on the bond required
by the United States on a federal project,
he loses the benefit of the act and the protection of the bond required by the federal
government but not his claim or remedy unless otherwise barred. Thus, the Miller
Act is no bar to plaintiff!s complaint and
its one year statute of limitations is not
applicable:
Plaintiff alleges that the state
Mechanics Lien laws (sec. 38-1-1 et seq.)
are not applicable because Section 1 thereof
specifically provides that its provisions do
not apply to any public building, structure
or improvement and this case involves a public improvement. Plaintiff further contends
that Chapter 2 of Title 14 dealing with
mechanic?s and materialmen's liens on private contract does not apply because defendant
Prince is not an owner but was a contractor;
and that Chapter 1 of said Title relating to
public contracts is not applicable because
the project did not involve furnishing work
for the state or any of its political subdivisions. Plaintiff thus contends that the
six year statute of limitations relating to
written contracts is controlling and that
the action may be maintained, or that the
four or three year statutes could apply instead of the one year statute set forth in
Section 14-2-2.
It is my opinion that the fact that the
bond required of Prince was by the general contractor Tolman, rather than by the "owner" of
the land does not take the contract outside of
the scope of Chapter 2, Title 14, and that contractors, sureties, materialmen and laborers
all are bound to meet the requirements of
Sec. 14-2-1 et seq. including that of commencing

(6)
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the action within one year from the date the
last materials were furnished or the labor
performed.
This plaintiff has not done and its motion
for partial summary judgment is denied except
as otherwise indicated-with respect to the applicability of the Miller Act, and defendant West1*
ern!s motion for summary judgment of dismissal
is granted.,T
The court thereupon entered an order denying Arnold's
motion for partial summary judgment and granting Western's
motion for dismissal.

Appeal is taken from both facets

of that order.

ARGUMENT
• ~

-••

'

•

•

-

*

*

Because of the possibility that the Supreme Court
could affirm on the basis that the trial court was right
for the wrong reason, we shall discuss the various
issues presented, even though some were not relied upon
by the court in making its ruling.

The Court Correctly Ruled That The
Miller Act Was Inapplicable
The language of the Miller Act is controlling in
determining that it does not apply.

It provides that:

11

(a) Before any contract, exceeding
$2,000 in amount for the construction, alter-

(7)
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ation, or repair of any public building or
public work of the United States is awarded
to any person, such person shall furnish to
the United States the following bonds, which
shall become binding upon the award of the
contract to such person, who is hereinafter
designated as T contractor y :
(1) A performance bond with a
surety or sureties satisfactory to the officer awarding such contract, and in such amount
as he shall deem adequate, for the protection
of the United States.
•*".,,•'"*.,
.a. A payment bond with a surety
or sureties satisfactory to such officer for the protection of all persons
supplying labor and material in the
prosecution of the work provided for
in said contract for the use of each
such persons..." 40 USC 270(a).
"(b) Every suit instituted under this section shall be brought in the name of the United
States for the use of the person suing, in the
United States District Court for any district in
which the contract was to be performed and executed and not elsewhere, irrespective of the amount in controversy in such suit, but no such
suit shall be commenced after the expiration of
one year after the day on which the last of the
labor was performed or material was supplied by
him. The United States shall not be liable for
the payment of any costs or expenses of any such
suit.11 40 USC 270(b).
That act requires the contractor to furnish the
United States a bond.

There is no provision for a sub-

contractor to furnish the contractor a bond.

Arnold's

action is on the bond furnished by the subcontractor to
the contractor.

Consequently, the court correctly con-

cluded that the Miller Act did not apply.

It correctly

(8)
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ruled that the state court had jurisdiction because
the exclusive federal court jurisdiction provided for
therein was inapplicable.

It also correctly ruled

that the Miller Act one year limitation provision was
inapplicable.

*

One Year State Statutes Of
1

Limitations Are Inapplicable

"Little Miller Act n
Western argued that there is a one year limitation
provision in the "Little Miller Act," 14-1-6 UCA, wherein contractors with the state or its political subdivisions have a bond requirement.
The "Little Miller Act" relates to persons...
"bidding to do work...for the state, or for
any political subdivision thereof." 14-1-1.1
Since this was a federal project and not one for the
state or any political subdivision thereof, the "Little
Miller Act" and its one year limitation provisions are
inapplicable.
The court properly did not apply it.
Mechanic's Lien Act
The one year limitation provision in 38-1-11 UCA

(9)
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referred to in the court's memorandum decision is inapplicable; not only for the reason given by the court, that
38-1-1 provides that the

fr

chapter shall not apply to any

public building, structure or improvements," but more
obviously, because no lien is asserted by Arnold.
The court properly did not apply it.
Private Contracts Bonding Act
After considering and properly concluding that the
one year limitation in the Miller Act, "Little Miller
Act" and Mechanic!s Lien Act were inapplicable because
the bond sued on herein was not of the type involved in
any of those acts, the court illogically applied another.
The court concluded that the one year limitation in
14-2-2 UCA bars Arnold's action.

Chapter 14-2 pro-

vides that a landowner making improvements shall require
the contractor to furnish a bond.

The court ruled that

the one year limitation therein was applicable to this
situation, in which the contractor required the subcontractor to furnish a bond which ran to the contractor.
The Private Contracts bonding act provides that...
""the owner of any interests in land entering
into a contract, involving $500 or more, for
the construction...of any... improvement upon
land...shall...obtain from the contractor a
bond... Such bond shall run to the owner..."
1TT-1 UCA (emphasis addeT)

(10)
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If that act be so construed that it is applied
to contracts for improvements on public unpatented
land owned by the United SCates, such construction
would require the United States to obtain a bond
from the contractor.

The State of Utah could not

impose such a>requirement upon the sovereign United
States."' . Furthermore^- this action involves a bond
which was not required by the owner of land from the
contractor, but by the contractor from his subcontractor. ;The bond ran to the contractor, oiot to the
owner, 'r.-\

^ - •'.--•— :

:..,<*•

Tt is therefore obvious that the Private Contracts
bonding act relates to a different type of transaction,
consequently*, the oner year limitation of 14-2-2 contained therein is inapplicable.

>

. -^'<:,;-*.

Rader vs. Manufacturer's Casualty Insurance Company, 242 F.2d 419 is a similar case, wherein the one
giving a* bond required by statute to be furnished to
the"United States, in turn became indemnified by a
bond given by the defendant bonding company and by
agreements executed by individuals.

The court held

that the second indemnification was a collateral
matter and that the statute did not apply.

The court

said in diseussing^the second bond^-ajKl indemnification

(11)
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agreements:
"None of these were required to be exeecuted by any law of the United States in connection with the giving of a surety bail bond.
The various agreements under attack are collateral arrangements of the surety and indemnitors
and were executed to afford protection to the
defendant surety company and its agents, and
did not inure to the benefit of the United
States."
As in the Rader case, Western's bond was not given
by the one required by statute to obtain it and it di*d ..
not run to the one the statute required that it should.
It was a collateral arrangement of the prime contractor
to indemnify itself against loss for which it, in turn,
had indemnified the United States.
The fact that the obligee of the bond was not the
obligee required by a statute was held in United States
of America For the Use of General Accident Fire and Life
Assurance Corporation, Ltd,, vs. Maguire Homes, Inc., and
American Surety Company of New York, 186 F.Supp. 659,
660 to make the statute inapplicable.

The court there

held that the federal court had no jurisdiction over a
claim on a bond in which the United States is not the
obligee.

The court said:

"The first of these bonds named Maguire
Homes of Boston, Inc., and National Homes Acceptance Corporation as obligees; and the second
named Maguire Homes of Providence, Inc., and
National Homes Realty Corporation as obligees.

(12)
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-•----.

There was no law of the United States requiring that any such bonds should be executed. Surely neither the Miller Act, 40 *• .i
USCA 270(a), nor the Capehart Act, 42 USCA
1594 applied, for those statutes contemplate
.. bonds in which the United States is the obligee. Not being bonds executed under any
law of the United States, this Court lacks., •;
jurisdiction under 28 USC 1352. Rader vs.
Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Company,
2d Cir. , 242 F.2d 419>
*
The trial court reasoned that the Miller Act was

inapplicable because the bond referred to therein was,
. ,not the type of bond required by the act.

It illogically

n failed to apply the same reasoning when considering .;
T-4,: whether or not the bond requiring an owner improving
^ its land to furnish a bond is applicable to a situation
in which a bond is furnished by someone else.
3

An early case in which Sthis court construed the

act which preceeded the existing Private Contracts bonding act 14-2-1 et seq. is Liberty Coal and Lumber Company vs. Snow, 53 U.298, 178 P. 341.

This court was

:..*. determining who was required under the-act to furnish
a bond.

In cqnsidering the language of the predecessor

act, it concluded that an owner of land who had his
father build a home thereon with the agreement that the
father could live therein 'for- a period^of time was an
"owner" and as such had a duty to require his father
to furnish a bond.

The opinion makes clear that the"

(13)
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bond the act relates to is that required by the owner.
The court said:

,

i

;

"The statute does not concern itself
with the legal relationship of the parties;
that is, it is quite immaterial whether the
agreement to construct a building upon land
is made between the owner thereof and the
contractor, or between the owner and the
builder, or between him and his tenant, or
between him and any other person; but if
the owner of the land contracts for the construction of a building on his land, the
statute makes it his duty to comply with its
terms if he desires to escape personal liability. The purpose of the statute is to
prevent the owners of land from having
their lands improved with the materials and
labor furnished and performed by third persons, and thus to enhance the value of such
lands, without becoming personally responsible for the reasonable value of the materials
and labor which enhances the value of those
lands."
The limitation provision relating to the act cannot
apply unless the act itself applies.

In no way can the

contractor Tolman be considered to have been an "owner"
and thus one required by the act to furnish the bond.
The Private Contracts bond act is not designed to place
an obligation* upon the contractor to require a bond from
its subcontractor, nor to impose liability upon the contractor for failure to obtain such a bond.

^"

A further illustration of the fact that the Private Contracts bond act should not be applied is the
• fact that the particular wording of 14-2-1 does not

(14)
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require the owner to furnish a bond in all instances
in which work is done.

For instance, in King Brothers,

Inc., r vs. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 13\U.2d:339;, 374 P.2d .,:
254, this court was looking carefully at whether qr not
the work"; was such as that referred to in 14-2-1 as' being
included within "construction of building, structure,
or improvements1' 'and remanded, the case to the trial
court to determine whether or not a furnace for drying
lumber was such an improvement.

Here liability or

lack thereof should notbe^determined upon the basis •>-:-*';
of any such refinement set forth in the language of
.14-2-1.

In other words, liability here f^r excava-

tion work should not be dependent upon whether or not
excavation is the type of w©fk included within

f,

con>/

struction of building,/structure or improvement."
,A further reason*that 14-2-2 UCA is inapplicable
is that Arnold is suing upon &• .bond that was furnished.
The limitation in 14-2-2 is by its terms applicable to
liability for failure to furnish a bond.

The pertinent

language is as follows:
"Any person subject to the provisions
of this chapter, who shall fail to obtain
such good and sufficient bond*.... shall be
personally liable... Actions to recover on
such liability shall be commenced within
one year..."
J - •

»

.

:

"

'

-

'

•

•

•

-

•

-

(15)
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- -,

-. - ---

s~?'

The trial court seemed to feel that because a
erne year limitation period was expressly provided
for in various situations involving construction
work, that there should be a one year limitation in
every such situation, and that it would be logical
that such should follow.

If, indeed, it would be

more logical to have a one year limitation apply in
every suchsituation, that is a legislative, not a
judicial function.
Statutes of limitation, being in derogation of
rights existing at comihon law, w&re originally strictly construed.

Although, now they are often liberally

construed, they should not be applied to situations
not contemplated by 'the legislature;- It1has been said
in discussing applicability of a statute of limitations:
"•..such statute applies only to the particular actions which it recites, and no others,
u\--.i and the courts cannot, uhdfer the guise of construction, apply a statute of limitations to
cases not within the statutory provisions.ff
51 Am. Jur.2d, Limitation of Actions, par. 61.
It is therefore apparent that for the following
reasons, 14-2-2 is inapplicable"
1.

The owner of land did not require the bond.

2.

The contractor with the owner did not furnish the bdiid* ^.IiBna v.Tiiij.^.rl .t:..^.-

3.

The bond did not run to the owner.

(16)
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.4.

The limitation applies to an action for :^
failure to obtain a bond, rather than to
an action on the bond.

No one year limitation being applicable to this
action, we conclude that the six year limitation for
claims under written instruments, set forth in 78-1223, is the applicable statute of 1imitations,' and that
this action is not barred.

-;

Real Party In Interest

Western, in its answer, set forth the defense
that Arnold was not a third party beneficiary and/
therefore,, could not sue on the bond.

~

- .*
"l'

~

The pleadings,'; answers to interrogatories and
admissions on file show that the parties who know
the facts concerning the use of the equipment, who
are plaintiff, who owned it, and defendant Prince,

_

who rented it, state that it was used by Prince on
the job for which WesCernfiirniferhed the bond»

There

is no genuine issue af fact in relation thereto.
- This court, long ago, concluded that leased equipment is considered as being "material" used on a job,
and rentals therefor are covered by a labor and materials bond.

J. P. To1ton Investment Company vs.

(17)
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"

Maryland Casualty Company, 77 U. 226, 293 P. 611, 615.
Rule 17(a) URCP provides in part "every action
shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in
interest."

Plaintiff, as third party beneficiary, is

the real party in interest, and as such, is a proper
party plaintiff.
T,

The general rule which permits a third person for whose benefit a contract is made to
enforce the contract enables a person not
named in the bond, but for whose benefit the
bond was given, to bring an action to enforce,
rights under the bond." 12 Am. Jur.2d, Bonds,
Par. 39.
"Contractor's bonds. Under the principle that
the person for whose benefit a contract is made
with another may maintain an action on such contract...a public bond, required by statute of
contractors, conditioned for the protection of
those who furnish labor or materials for construction of public works contracted for, can
be enforced by any person to whom the principal
is indebted for work or material under the contract secured by the bond..."11 C.J.S., Bonds,
Par. 106.
"Who may sue; parties. As a general rule where
the bond of a contractor for a state improvement
is for the benefit of persons supplying labor or
material, such persons.may sue on the bond, although the state is the only one named as obligee
and there is no express provision giving third
persons rights thereunder, and notwithstanding
the absence of privity of contract between the
principal contractor and such persons." 81 C. J. S
States, Par. 119.
Some authorities have even gone so far as to hold
that the named obligee cannot sue.

17 Am. Jur.2d.,

Contractor's Bonds, Par. 125.

(18)
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In Deluxe Glass Company vs.. Martin, et al., 116 U.
144, 208 P. 2d 1127, 11.31, this court, in considering a

-

bond, which one of the parties contended was not a statutory bond, held that, assuming that it was not a statutory
bond and was a common lav obligation, "the weight of
authority is to the effect that under the bond here involved...the plaintiff (who was a materialman) may sue
the surety. "

'"*•••**.

CONCLUSION
There is no genuine issue of fact on any of the
following:

$11,415.74 is the amount of unpaid rental

due from Prince to Arnold, together with interest from
November 12, 1975, the date of such adjudication.

The

equipment rented was used by Prince on the Fish Lake
job.

Western guaranteed that Prince would pay material-

men.

Arnold is a materialman and is unpaid.

The

action is not barred by a one year statute of limitation.
Arnold, as a third party beneficiary, is entitled to
summary judgment against the bonding company Western.
Respectfully submitted,

Brayton, Lowe § Hurley
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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